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Introduction 
In the discussion of the current dynamics of the foreign exchange (FX) market and capital 
flows in the recent period, what stands out is the combination of a global search for yield – 
manifest in FX carry trades and narrowing spreads – and a default complacency about risk – 
manifest in selling volatility and increasing leverage, facilitated by innovations in the products 
available to more market participants at lower costs, and, until recently, a lesser attention to 
credit quality and creditworthiness in many deals in order to continue to generate volume in 
new transactions. Unprecedented liquidity, particularly mushrooming sovereign and retail 
pools, amplifying the past provision of liquidity by global central banks, and the increasing 
leverage in financial products and volume of deal flow intersected to provide a self-
reinforcing reduction of friction in the system. 
Equally important in discussing these dynamics is consideration of developments among 
agents: central bank policy makers and their policy frameworks and the market practitioners’ 
perceptions of them. The proliferation of more independent, rules-based central banks, 
operating policy with increasing transparency and less volatility has underpinned an 
unprecedented increase in synchronous, interdependent economic growth and moderate 
inflation over a larger portion of the global system. However, one consequence of this signal 
policy framework success has been that it has also facilitated some of the risk taking in the 
financial economy. Strong global growth, low volatility, and ample liquidity conditions have 
combined with financial innovation to impede central bank policy transmission. This 
impedance has been strengthened and extended by the market perception of the opportunity 
costs of a more rules- and forecast-based approach in central banking: loss of both the will 
and capacity for short-term, discretionary market management by central banks against the 
background of the gradual removal of the unprecedented liquidity provided from 2001–2003. 
As a result of innovation and liquidity markets have become more short-term oriented at a 
time when policy is seen as more medium-term focused: in the gap between the two the 
importance of perception/misperception and uncertainty increases. 
The issue of market perception/misperception and the expectations generated from it has 
been and will remain critical to framing the discussion of the challenges facing policy making 
in this current cycle: perception/misperception of the economic cycle and its sub-cycles, 
whether temporal, regional, or sectoral, and how insulated one can remain from the rest; of 
whether shocks are confined primarily to the financial sector or extend to the real economy; 
and of the nature of policy frameworks’ flexibility and the reaction function at various central 
banks. One area where the issue poses a question is in the evolving discussion – among 
central bankers, and between central bankers and market practitioners – on optimal 
communication and transparency under conditions of uncertainty: whether increased 
communication and transparency can work against or at least not assist policy execution 
(and market perception of it) under persistent uncertainty or increasing risks to both inflation 
and growth. A less often discussed dimension is whether policy frameworks, particularly 
inflation referencing regimes developed over the last two decades, utilizing their existing 
policy target frameworks are or will be optimally suited to the current and future cycles: 
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the evolving market is a source of uncertainty, creating a unique set of conditions for the 
financial landscape and driving FX dynamics and capital flows. 
The uncertainty created in the interplay of central bank policy and market perception is set 
against and amplified by the historic evolving structural shift in the balance of economic 
power and the degree of innovation and participation within the global financial system: the 
increasing integration of major developing economies (particularly in greater Asia, where 
growth has been the strongest, accumulation of FX reserves greatest, and FX flexibility 
modest) and the proliferation of the volumes, instruments, complexity, and atomization of 
participation in the financial system. This shift is creating a critical dimension of additional 
future uncertainty: uncertainty attending the broad transition away from what has been a 
structurally constructive environment for policy making over the last decade-and-a-half, 
largely characterized by tailwinds: i.e. the confluence of increasing globalization of economic 
factors and trade linkages allowing an unprecedented expansion and deepening of the global 
economy (in particular characterized by the increasing integration of China and India, of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and of the post-crisis recovery of East Asia), 
the elaboration and increasingly widespread success in adopting, operating, and diffusing 
rules-based central banking frameworks referencing price stability as the sine qua non of 
policy credibility and effectiveness, and the global trend towards increased central bank 
independence and transparency, in the context of generally more flexible exchange rate 
regimes. After more than 15 years, however, there is little doubt that we are at or near an 
inflexion point, transitioning to a less certain and possibly less constructive, more contentious 
policy environment: i.e. one characterized by an absence of tailwinds and some potentially 
notable headwinds. 
In the developing economies there are the questions around the current and next stages of 
development, of better balancing of savings, investment, and consumption, and of whether 
adjustments will take place in terms of deepening and integrating domestic financial markets 
and increasing flexibility of exchange rate regimes, particularly given the reserves that have 
been built up and accelerating over the last five years. In the advanced industrial economies 
there are the questions of how to cope with demographic and underfunded liabilities 
challenges, the diffusion of economic power to more poles and to previously less-developed 
countries, and the potential domestic criticisms of globalization, particularly surrounding 
uncertain or less obvious gains which could fuel protectionist critiques and populist policy 
responses. For the global system broadly there are the questions of where the non-
contentious growth will come from given the paucity of new integrators in contrast with the 
last two decades (i.e. no new China, FSU and Eastern Europe, or post-crisis Asia), how 
central bank policy frameworks facing reduced or mitigated policy transmission will evolve to 
cope with pressure from conditions whereby the global growth rate may not continue to 
accelerate yet while inflation pressures, despite the proliferation of targeting regimes, may 
continue to build. 
In considering this environment of potentially less constructive conditions, the two intertwined 
sources of medium-term risk and uncertainty looming for markets in general and for FX and 
capital flows in particular remain the dynamics and evolution of the US current account deficit 
and the stores and flows of Asian savings. So far, even in the recent period where global 
growth and employment have continued to record historic highs despite what is already four 
quarters of sub-trend growth in the US and an orderly, though not equally distributed, 
depreciation in the US Dollar, little sustained progress has been made in reducing the 
pressures in the global system. In fact the symbiosis between US deficit and Asian saving 
and recycling dynamics is still reinforcing the pressures in the system. 
The present transition period is defined by coming to terms with less capacity for policy to 
“manage” the near term, under conditions of greater uncertainty, and with more unintended 
consequences, against the background of the continuing structural power shift. These 
challenges will be steeper and potentially more problematic in the future if the current multi-
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expected, or if it becomes less synchronous, accentuating the lack of substantive success in 
reducing global imbalances. Given the scope for market misperception, such an outcome 
could further reduce the already constrained room for policy maneuver, highlighting existing 
tensions in an environment of policy transmission impedance and uncertainty. 
1.  Key developments in the financial landscape 
The discussion of key developments in the financial landscape can be distilled to one of 
capital, carry, and complacency. That is, the dynamics in foreign exchange and capital flows 
have been a function of liquidity in the system, carry opportunities created both by the 
liquidity in the system and by rate differentials among key economies, and complacency 
about the persistence of a low volatility environment. This low volatility environment, 
stemming from and driven by liquidity conditions, has facilitated, focused, and reinforced the 
attention of the market on the global search for yield. An added dimension of this 
complacency, which also derives from liquidity in the system and views on its structural 
character, is directly related to global central bank policy making and strikes to the heart of 
the most interesting element: the perception-expectation dynamic between the market and 
policy makers: in this case, regarding complacency, the perception that policy is at the mercy 
of liquidity. 
The starting point for any discussion with market practitioners has been the structural and 
cyclical sources of liquidity and how they have been evolving, which is to say increasing for 
several years – from the sovereign side, the retail side, and the financial side. In fact, this 
starting point is often not even articulated anymore; it has become a default assumption. For 
several years the factor fuelling the attention given to the liquidity in the system was the 
unprecedented accommodation from global central banks in response to the bursting of the 
investment led and equity bubble in 2000–2001, which was then exacerbated by the impact 
of September 2001, and prolonged by accounting and research scandals and the war which 
together further dampened the environment for risk taking into 2003. After three years of 
normalization, that central bank cyclical liquidity condition has changed – the first variable in 
the equation to do so. In fact, it is potentially entering a new phase, as the global central 
banking stance has transitioned from extreme accommodation, to the phased, measured 
removal of accommodation, to the approach of some of neutrality, and finally to questions of 
policy restrictiveness in theoretical and prudential terms for others. What remains to be seen 
is how the evolution of this policy making, as it affects with a lag, will interact with the 
evolution of the other variables in the equation – sovereign, retail, financial. 
One global expansion, many different starting points and sensitivities 
Central banks have been tightening policy for some time but where they are rate-wise and 
why they are tightening differs, and each of these banks has faced periods of misperception 
in the market. In thinking about the present spectrum of core and peripheral advanced 
industrial economy banks, they can be grouped as either vanguard or rearguard in terms of 
when they got started and where they are currently located:
1 the BoE is the core bank in the 
vanguard group but the group more notable for the “vanguard of the vanguard” peripherals is 
led by the RBNZ and the RBA. In the rearguard, the ECB is the core bank but this group also 
has interesting peripherals such as the SNB, Riksbank and the BoC. Two important core 
banks – the BoJ and the Fed – sit at the margins or between the two groups. The broad 
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contour of the policy trajectory has been similar across the spectrum: a policy of 
normalization, conducted gradually but consistently until a zone of more or less neutral 
observation is reached (allowing observation of the past policy as it affected with a lag and to 
observe various global elements affecting their economies, including developing country 
growth, commodity demand, and global liquidity), before an extended period considering 
whether to tweak policy in either a more or less restrictive direction. 
The BoJ can be seen as at the tail-end of the rearguard group, falling farther behind a still 
hiking SNB. Some, indeed, would put the BoJ in its own class and question even whether the 
bank has truly escaped the shadow of the ZIRP (zero interest rate policy) and deflation and 
whether it can further normalize policy, particularly if the global cycle were to peak before 
much more normalization can be effected. From a global relative perspective the BoJ 
certainly looks rearguard, if even that; but from a relative Japanese perspective it could be 
seen as vanguard or at least anticipatory, rather than reactive. I note this distinction because 
in the market it is a sport of sorts to dismiss the BoJ as hopeless or at least helpless, as not 
having a real and financial economy to work with and so ultimately incapable of joining the 
league of normal central banking. But against the experience of the late 1990s and the 
beginning of this decade, one could argue that the BoJ has demonstrated elements of clearly 
forward-looking policy aimed in part at creating new expectations and joining other 
normalizing banks. 
Most importantly, there is the case of the Fed. Acting as the fulcrum, the Fed lies between 
the two main groups with its actions and the market perceptions of the prospects for its 
action as critically important to the environment and scope for both vanguard and rearguard 
policy making. The Fed can be seen as an out-of-phase core bank of the vanguard group in 
the way that it initiated its easing cycle in 2001, the way it has approached and conducted 
the normalization of policy off the extreme accommodation of 1% from 2004, in 2005 and 
2006 when it was almost the only bank conducting policy rate changes (while the rearguard 
banks retained their accommodative policy stances and vanguard banks were in their period 
of neutralized observation), and in the present period of observation with restrictive leanings 
for 15 months. 
As mentioned, the vanguard-rearguard phenomenon is temporal relative to the last several 
years rather than qualitative. What is shared across the spectrum from the RBNZ to the BoJ 
is that each bank has bucked market assumptions over this cycle in terms of starting, staying 
in train, or delivering additional policy after having stopped. Markets have repeatedly tried to 
fit the present and the future of this cycle into the experiences of past cycles, effectively 
defaulting to using the past cycle as an inductive template for assumptions about and context 
for viewing current cycle policy, creating multiple individual and collective misperception 
events. Markets have also over-predicted activity. Sometimes this has been primarily a 
function of a backward-looking default in the market against forward-looking, medium-term 
policy framework focused policy action (or inaction). At other times the misperceptions have 
come from the struggle to interpret how various structural or environmental forces are 
intersecting with individual economies – e.g. liquidity, commodities, etc. 
2.  Changes in the landscape of the business of FX 
Along with the issues of market psychology, policy framework basis and communication, and 
global economic integration, it is important to note some of the ways in which the business of 
FX has been transformed in recent years and how these changes and the sheer growth of 
the market are affecting the transmission and deployment of capital in global banking and 
integration, with implications for carry, liquidity, transparency, and uncertainty. 
The primary transformations which are taking place include structure, process, and product 
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at driving and capturing electronic business, the proliferation of new trading strategies that 
rely on increasingly rapid executions harnessing increased computing power, and the rise of 
new target growth markets among retail, institutional, and sovereign customer bases. 
As with other industries there may be a period of adaptation where technological advances 
outstrip the ability of management structures, processes, and techniques to absorb and fully 
harness them. 
Bank transformation, integration 
Banks have been undergoing unprecedented general consolidation at the national and 
international level and consolidating various types of business to try to drive efficiencies, 
reduce costs, and capture more business, whether from investment banking, sales and 
trading, private equity, hedge funds, or asset management and insurance. Within banks 
there has been a drive to consolidate previously separate businesses such as FX and 
Interest Rates and Commodities franchises under one umbrella to maximize efficiencies, 
capture synergies, and develop new products. There has been a similar trend towards 
integrating previously separate geographical centers under global remits based in key money 
centers. Finally, within banks as within the market there has been a tendency to blur the line 
between previously distinct G3/G10 and Emerging Markets (EM) businesses. Integration has 
been reinforced both in EM countries as business growth has come from expansion of EM 
business, and through the increasing scope and scale of EM products available to clients 
globally, but particularly those in mature markets looking to enhance yield and diversification. 
Increased electronic deal flow 
One of the areas of particularly notable recent growth is in acquisitions and ventures 
between banks and online trading platforms and electronic communications networks 
(ECNs). Some recent examples include ICAP’s acquisition of EBS, as well as the creation of 
FX MarketSpace, a venture between the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) and Reuters. 
Examples of alliances between banks and online trading platforms include Deutsche Bank 
with FXCM and ABN with OANDA. Additional deals mooted involve Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management and HotSpotFX, and Barclays and UBS have also been mentioned as looking 
to ally with partners.
2 Two key drivers for many of these link-ups are the increasing role of 
electronic broking and the competition for market share and cross-selling to the increasingly 
large retail investor business. Current survey research suggests that 56% of all FX trading 
was done electronically in 2006, with estimates rising to 75% for 2010.
3 Not to be left out, it 
has been suggested that central banks have also seen the utility of the ECNs, with the RBNZ 
mentioned as having used Reuters to intervene in spot Kiwi on June 11.
4 
New customers, products, and trading segments 
Beyond the past strength of FX-dedicated hedge funds on the buy-side, the number and 
nature of participants has noticeably broadened. Central banks themselves are now bigger 
players than ever, in addition to those increasing overlay, and asset managers looking to 
enhance international returns through aggressive trading of FX. There has been an increase 
in the number and complexity of instruments, new platforms and venues for transactions, a 
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proliferation of volume in buy-side and proprietary activities, of exposure among non-traditional 
and passive investors (asset management, pension funds gaining mandates for exposure to 
FX and FX overlay products, as well as to more international exposure), and a very 
substantial growth in retail business, with the expectation of further acceleration.
5 
An example of some of the new products on offer include Citi’s recently launched “Alpha” 
and “Beta” FX indexes, six tradable FX indexes employing active management and FX 
options to generate returns via “trend, carry, emerging market carry, economic factor model, 
long volatility and short volatility” strategies in the former case, and “G10 carry, emerging 
markets carry, and purchasing power parity strategies” in the latter.
6 
One major new trading segment that is driving growth and pushing the harnessing of 
technology and application development forward is algorithmic trading. Because of the 
quantitative component and the requirement for millisecond-measured execution, this new 
segment of growth is particularly suited to maximizing access to the fastest electronic 
networks and best integrated platforms, which banks and others are developing in house or 
seeking to ally externally with in order to capture volume. It is one of the primary drivers of 
increased buy-side volumes. 
One footnote, given the turmoil in the CDO (collateralized debt obligation) and CLO 
(collateralized loan obligation) markets over the past several weeks: the launching in May of 
the first rated CFXO (collateralized foreign exchange obligation). This instrument had 
maturities of three to five years, with an underlying portfolio basket of 10 currency pairs at a 
time selected by the manager from a slate of 25–30 currencies from G10 and most liquid 
EMs, and was expected to pay coupons of 80–100 bps on the AAA-rated tranche and return 
20% on the equity tranche. Not surprisingly, the notation of the launch highlighted the 
marketed customer base as “insurance companies, pension funds, private clients and banks” 
and state that regionally strong institutional investor demand was expected in Western and 
Eastern Europe.
7 
Volumes and volatility 
FX volumes continue to rise dramatically and highlight the trends in the space. Notable 
drivers include the continuing rise of FX as an asset class, the above-mentioned proliferation 
and facilitation of algorithmic trading strategies, the gains in retail and passive institutional 
growth, and the acceleration in carry trades. This aggregate strength can be seen in some 
survey-based data from 2006, collected by Greenwich Associates, where overall volumes 
were reported as 17% higher, driven by retail volume gains of 54% (bettering the 40% growth 
in 2005) and 23% growth among fund managers and pension funds, both of these groups in 
contrast with more muted growth among hedge funds and corporates (7% and flat, 
respectively v 2005).
8 More recent BIS data covering the first quarter of 2007 highlight the 
strength of favored carry trade currencies, in particular the Kiwi, Aussie, Yen, and Swissie: 
while overall trading volumes for listed FX derivatives contracts saw 26% growth, Kiwi 
contracts more than doubled, Aussie volumes increased 85%, Yen 65%, and Swissie 42%.
9 
The most recent data from June volumes at the CME illustrate the acceleration in 2007 v 2006, 
as recent volatility in currency, interest rate, and credit markets contributed to record volumes 
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for both voice and electronic brokers: at the CME average daily volumes in FX products were 
up 41% v June 2006, while average daily volumes in electronic broking were up 48%. ICAP’s 
electronic broking crossed the $1 trillion threshold on June 7 and 8 (v $842 billion average in 




Two representative currency cases – the New Zealand Dollar, the “Kiwi”, and the Canadian 
Dollar, the “Loonie” – are presented to capture some of the contending issues that have been 
observed in conversations with market practitioners regarding the interplay of specific 
domestic and common global currency drivers; the perception/misperception dynamic and 
some of the inductive assumptions regarding policy and policy makers; as well as FX market 
environmental elements regarding mandates which may have amplified the observations and 
be indicative of continuing contributing factors going forward. 
The cases of the Kiwi and the Loonie over the last 12–18 months illustrate episodes where 
the same currency can trade very differently depending on which among many and changing 
factors become primary drivers in market perception and pricing: where on the rate policy 
spectrum a bank is, how active or inactive the bank is perceived to be, how sensitive the 
economy is perceived to be to regional trade and financial linkages, and whether other asset 
markets’ trends become drivers (e.g. commodities). 
Kiwi: from pillar to post 
There is perhaps no better example over the last 12–18 months of a bank buffeted so 
strongly by a presumptive market, the nexus of specific domestic and common international 
developments, evolving data and forecasts, and challenging policy choices and their 
communication than the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). And throughout the period, 
the currency and capital flows issue has been a particularly salient factor, never less than in 
the last two months as global sentiment joined with consecutive policy rate hikes from 
already the highest level among advanced industrial countries (with apologies to Iceland) to 
produce a further acceleration in the appreciation of the Kiwi, up from levels already described 
as unsustainably and unjustifiably high. This confluence of domestic and international factors 
forced upon policy makers the challenge of acting to try to affect one-way sentiment by 
backing up words with intervening action to sell its currency, even as it became clear that it 
was not yet done hiking the policy rate. As we have seen again, even more recently, in the 
case of the Bank of Korea, the RBNZ is not alone in this predicament and it is not 
inconceivable that it might be joined by other central banks. 
This episode has been remarkable also in terms of the discussion of the changing landscape 
of global participation of market practitioners initiating or increasing exposure to peripheral 
country currency trading – a development akin to the expansion of mandates to increase 
exposure to EM among previously more strictly mandated portfolios. And the performance 
over the past year may only encourage more of such participation given portfolio managers’ 
desire to find something that “moves” and “trends”. 
The experience of the last six months stands in contrast to the six months following the 
previous moves by the RBNZ at the end of 2005. At that time many of the same market 
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participants were convinced that the policy rate of 7.25% would prove the death knell for the 
Kiwi and further tighten the noose around the New Zealand economy, making it more likely 
that the RBNZ would sooner have to admit the coming of a sustained easing cycle. This view 
was being reinforced to a degree by the coincident expected easing cycle priced for the BoE, 
based on market assumptions about the necessity of a sustained easing cycle in the context 
of housing, credit, employment, and sentiment tailing off and in the presence of an over-
valued currency. The predominance of this type of view of the RBNZ’s presumed policy 
trajectory was reflected graphically in both the rates and currency markets: the money 
market curve became inverted by more than 120 bps and the Kiwi weakened 17% (against 
the US Dollar) in less than four months (by 22% against the Yen). 
The turn in this tide of sentiment came from a reconsideration of both domestic and 
international developments. Domestically, as burgeoning signs of a second wind to the 
economy emerged, the gap was narrowed between what the markets had assumed and 
what the RBNZ was seeing and forecasting. This domestic reconsideration came in the 
context of and was amplified by external environment developments: notably developments 
in the US and Japan which dramatically altered market perceptions and assumptions about 
growth, inflation, and central bank policy, and from this attention to yield differentials and 
implications for carry. In the US, the spring 2006 inflation scare and market assumption of a 
Fed falling behind the curve and potentially needing to go to a 6% policy rate were 
challenged by the Bernanke Fed’s elaboration of a pre-emptive, forward-looking and 
forecast-based holding of the policy rate at 5.25%, the sharp initial correction in the third 
quarter in housing, along with the pressure on consumption and business investment 
sentiment from new record highs in energy and other commodity costs. In Japan, the 
success of the BoJ’s ending of QEP (Quantitative Easing Policy) and emergence from ZIRP 
gave way to the worse than expected reduction in the recalculation of inflation in 
August 2006 and then earlier and stronger challenges to the BoJ’s baseline outlook for both 
stable positive inflation and the strengthening of domestic demand on the basis of consistent 
increases in wages flowing through to consumption and sentiment. 
The last six months have provided another set of episodes where market perception and 
expectations created room for significant reorientation risk as the RBNZ delivered additional 
policy to the upside. As recently as February there was still some debate among market 
participants as to whether the RBNZ would deliver any additional policy and, if so, how 
necessary, credible, or effective it would be given the long period of policy inactivity. Some in 
the market had seen a case for the RBNZ to hike in the fourth quarter of 2006 (expectations 
of a hike rose to ~66% at the peak in October 2006) and saw its failure to deliver as an 
indication of timidity in face of non-tradable inflation and persistent strength in property, 
activity, and sentiment, but perhaps mitigated by attention to the strength of the currency and 
the risk that additional policy would exacerbate existing, and already worsening imbalances. 
Even after late February 2007, when the market recognized the likely move in the policy rate 
up from 7.25%, the battle only migrated to whether that move would or could be described as 
sufficient, again with quite a lot of discussion among market participants as to the issue of 
the RBNZ having been on the sidelines for more than a year. As it became clear that neither 
the risk re-appraisal consequent of the market-joined events in US subprime credit nor China 
A-share equities were impacting the domestic drivers of policy in New Zealand, and with 
some help from heightened attention to the potential requirement for additional policy in 
Australia, the next battle was over how strong a third wind was blowing in the New Zealand 
economy and how much additional policy would be necessary to contain it, particularly given 
the aggravating issue of the continued high level of the currency. 
The perception and expectation dynamic in the market was clear in conversations with 
market practitioners, who came to the conversation with views which included that the RBNZ 
should have done more earlier – this from a combination of post-hoc fitting as well as a 
certain nostalgia for the imagined past, and past policy makers: e.g. “Brash (previous RBNZ 




11 Ironically, despite having seen the RBNZ as too timid in moving away from 
7.25%, many of these same people did not expect back-to-back moves (in March and April 
2007) based on the view that the RBNZ would not act on an OCR review meeting and would 
instead wait for a policy statement meeting (i.e. wait three months between moves rather 
than six weeks). This assumption was further shattered when the RBNZ delivered a third and 
ultimately fourth consecutive move, the last one, to 8.25% in late July, coming even as the 
currency had strengthened – despite physical intervention to sell the Kiwi in June by the 
RBNZ – and also in the face of noises coming from the Finance Minister regarding potential 
alteration of the RBNZ’s policy target agreements. 
Beyond the idiosyncratic elements relating directly to New Zealand conditions and RBNZ 
policy, the issue of global risk re-appraisal and carry trade unwind episodes have also been 
strongly witnessed in the Kiwi market. For a period of time in late February and March, it 
became immaterial that the RBNZ had hiked to 7.5% and could conceivably have more work 
to do than previously imagined; equally immaterial was the weakness in Japan and the fact 
that the BoJ had barely cobbled together the consensus to move its OCR to .5% and looked 
like having gotten that second move away from ZIRP at the cost of being unable to deliver 
additional policy any time soon. Such fundamental elements, conducing to the risk of the 
widening of the carry differential over the rest of 2007 at both ends of the Kiwi/Yen cross, 
were pushed to the background as the sudden global risk re-appraisal unilaterally 
strengthened the Yen and weakened the Kiwi (Kiwi/Yen weakened by nearly 10% in 10 days 
in late February and early March 2007). 
But the February–March risk re-appraisal episode, like many such episodes over the past 
few years, proved short-lived. Speculative carry positions were rinsed, but the underlying 
policy stories at both ends of the cross were only reaffirming the outflows and eventually 
even the acceleration of Japanese retail investor participation in the carry trade. Soon after, 
speculative positions returned in the context of abundant global liquidity and a widening of 
the rate differential by an additional 75 bps, firmly reinforcing the fundamentals of the carry 
driver: Kiwi/Yen strengthened more than 25% over 12 weeks as weak data and questions 
about when the BoJ would be able to move again lingered and, over the same period in NZ, 
the acceleration in housing, higher than expected dairy payments, and stronger data 
underpinned the three additional tightenings by the RBNZ. 
Loonie: in the shadow of a weak US and commodity volatility 
A second case to consider in terms of market dynamics and the impact of policy perception 
is that of the Canadian Dollar, the “Loonie”, over the last 12–18 months. It has generally 
gained less attention (than say the Kiwi or Aussie) not least since the Bank of Canada (BoC) 
had, until recently, been inactive; and from a carry perspective, the Loonie suffered not only 
from negative carry versus the US Dollar but also stood out against other dollar-bloc 
currencies or commonwealth currencies (Kiwi, Aussie, Sterling) for its low rates. 
Furthermore, the Loonie and broader Canadian story has been viewed more often in terms of 
non-domestic drivers: i.e. caught either in the shadow of the presumed weakness of the US 
story or driven by commodity trends, particularly in energy. But it is exactly with regard to the 
shadow of the overly pessimistic view of the US story, or at least the several bouts of over-
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prediction of Fed policy easing, and the commodity story that makes the Loonie interesting to 
observe for the periods when it has broken out of this presumptive correlation and gained 
attention. When those external drivers have reached turning points there have been 
opportunities for the domestic conditions to come to the fore and drive de-coupling from US 
expectations. What stands out over the last 12–18 months is the shifting of the market-
perceived drivers and the assumptions built around them regarding price and policy, both in 
absolute and in relative terms. 
In the spring of 2006, as the US faced an inflation spike and the market over-priced 
expectations of Fed tightening, market expectations about BoC policy were likewise marked 
up after an initial hesitation. Then, as would be seen again this past April, domestic data and 
a strengthening theme in commodities conduced to strengthen the Loonie ~7%, pushing it 
above 91 cents/US Dollar, before the disappointment of building hopes for an additional 
summer move to 4.5%, which were then further amplified by the subsequent disappointment 
of Fed tightening assumptions in July for 5.5% in August. As a result, the Loonie quickly 
weakened along with and even relative to the US Dollar. 
For much of the period from August 2006 until this past March the Canadian money market, 
with a few exceptions, traded closely with US market assumptions about the Fed in light of 
risks to the US economy. Specifically, the episodes over-predicting risks of Fed easings were 
mirrored in the pricing of the policy horizon of the BoC and the weakening of the Loonie in 
absolute and relative terms. The weakening became even more pronounced as energy 
prices sharply corrected between September 2006 and January 2007 and as Canadian GDP 
disappointed, joining with the intensification of perceived US weakness after ISM first printed 
below 50 in November, which was seen through the lens of past cycle experiences as signaling 
proximity of Fed easings and reinforced a pre-existing attention to a period of six months 
between a last Fed tightening and the presumptive beginning of a subsequent easing cycle. 
The Loonie’s weakness continued well into March 2007, despite initial signs of a basing in 
commodities, as US factors still predominated, with the escalating concern with US subprime 
credit problems extending the drag from housing. It was only at the end of March that a 
significant de-coupling started to occur. The transformation was notable less for what was 
new and surprising than for successfully distracting the focus from the US weakness driver, 
and distinguishing Canadian economic strength, as well as seeing the amplifying effect that 
could come from the commodity driver. The first catalytic event was the domestic data 
surprise from February CPI (reported in March) which forced a reconsideration of 
assumptions of benign domestic inflation. When this was followed by further signals of 
strengthening activity, a set of reinforcing elements for appreciation was in place. 
Throughout the spring, prospects for solid growth and somewhat higher inflation forced a 
further reconsideration: that the BoC would remain stuck at 4.25%, while the Fed was still 
seen as at best remaining on hold. The concomitant re-pricings in the currency and the 
money markets were consolidated as the BoC signaled and delivered the policy tightening to 
4.5%, without ruling out further policy, and further by the rebound in crude prices to a record 
in late July. The Loonie strengthened more than 7% in as many weeks. After having 
substantially underperformed in the first quarter of 2007, the Loonie gained 13.5% against 
the US Dollar (and more than 20% against the Yen) in the period between late March and 
late July. 
4.  The current turmoil 
As one closing, real-time example of the tension between perception and expectations, and 
the operation of market psychology during a crisis, here below is a presentation of direct initial 
feedback from market practitioners on the events of Thursday and Friday August 9–10 2007 
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illiquidity and the extraordinary blow-out of critical interbank lending rates. Three distinct 
general judgments were expressed, particularly in comparing and contrasting the responses 
from the ECB and the Fed. 
ECB as leader; Fed as laggard 
In this view, some were strongly of the opinion that it was the ECB which demonstrated 
leadership and resolve in immediately providing a formal statement of support bolstered by 
the massive amount of available liquidity provided to the system in the initial tender and in 
the generous collateral acceptance, which together provided a sense that the bad situation 
would not be allowed to metastasize. The size of the liquidity provided, both on the Thursday 
and again on the Friday (August 9–10) may have been questioned by some, but it was seen 
as appropriate both to meet a physical need and to provide needed psychological bolstering. 
Among those holding this view, there was a concomitant opinion that the Fed did not 
demonstrate leadership and that, in particular in not issuing a statement and only providing 
modest additional liquidity (on Thursday August 9), it allowed an already fragile situation to 
deteriorate further and create additional risks to the global system as Friday opened in Asia 
and Europe. 
One key perception articulated by partisans of this view was that the ECB was quickly able to 
distinguish between short-term liquidity and less immediate monetary policy; and in making 
clear that the tender on Thursday was aimed at stabilizing short-term liquidity without 
question, it also maintained policy flexibility such that the signaled expected tightening of the 
policy rate at the September ECB meeting might still be executed and that the two actions 
would not necessarily be viewed as contradictory. 
In contrast, the Fed was seen as having left liquidity and monetary policy still confused and 
ending up bolstering neither: i.e. its actions – and inaction in terms of no formal statement 
until Friday August 10 – resulted in the short-term illiquidity problem persisting, if not 
worsening, and the expectation that near-term, if not immediate, monetary policy easings 
would be required being not only not dispelled, but intensified. Some took this critique further 
in suggesting that the confusion of liquidity and monetary policy was something shared by 
both Greenspan and Bernanke and that the current response could be seen as a direct result 
of the former: i.e. Greenspan was seen as too quick to provide too much liquidity and 
confidence by easing monetary policy and not making a distinction between the two, which 
then created additional medium-term problems for both liquidity and policy, whereas 
Bernanke’s response was seen as still confusing the two but in the opposite direction – in 
providing too little liquidity and confidence and still not bolstering monetary policy – and taken 
as a demonstration of clear opposition to the Greenspan response function. 
Fed as measured; ECB as too accommodating 
An alternative, equally strongly held opinion was that the ECB may have over-reacted and 
provided too much liquidity, thus introducing a risk of moral hazard, while the Fed acted 
prudently and maintained a degree of flexible response which could be modulated as events 
unfolded and additional feedback from the market was obtained. In this view the Fed reacted 
but did not over-react and did not inject moral hazard, though this at the risk of being seen as 
insufficiently sensitive to the nature and risks of the dislocations in the interbank funding 
market. The subsequent statement and provision of additional liquidity on three occasions on 
Friday was seen again as a prudent response, reflecting the feedback over the preceding 
24 hours and creating the necessary stability without injecting moral hazard. In this view the 
ECB actions over the two days were seen as at one extreme, the BoE’s lack of statement or 
additional liquidity operations at the other extreme, and the Fed in the middle, joined to lesser 
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To each their own 
A less judgmental, though minority view held that both ECB and Fed responses reflected the 
conditions in each market at the time and given the respective systems and instruments: 
i.e. that the triggering event first arose in Europe, European banks had been and were still 
the most vulnerable to the specific illiquidity, even though the underlying problem stemmed 
from US subprime credit, and the fact that the ECB operated on one-week repos on 
Tuesdays necessitated the larger, broader, and more explicit response; whereas, the Fed 
confronted a less extreme immediate problem, was not captive to one-week repos, and was 
able to judge by the time the US market opened that the problem was less acute for the US, 
though perhaps in part as a result of the previous ECB action. Some noted that the size and 
nature of the ECB tender created a condition at the US market open which generated a 
default expectation of a similar statement and response from the Fed, and the absence of 
such led to a renewed deterioration in conditions, opening up questions for some in the 
market that, whatever the responses, there ought to have been better or at least more clearly 
coordinated actions among the core central banks to avoid the appearance of a lack of 
coordination and thus being seen as adding to the destabilization and uncertainty in the 
market. 
Are the events of the last few days (acute perception of system-wide funding problems) and 
the last few weeks (second wave of subprime-sourced but broad scale risk re-appraisal) 
likely to prove a watershed event for market practitioners and central bank policy makers 
alike? Without yet having any perspective it is still possible to sketch the framework of the 
debate and risks, and it again encapsulates the issues of capital flows, carry, and 
complacency. On the one hand, there is a case that might be made that this current episode 
is merely a different magnitude version (longer-lasting, more deeply and extensively 
impacting) of past episodic bouts of risk re-appraisal over the past few years, where short-
term illiquidity issues will be overcome, risk re-pricing will be prudential and ultimately 
beneficial, but the fundamental drivers of structural liquidity will be re-asserted and attention 
will again be re-focused on carry and the search for yield, though likely with somewhat less 
gearing. On the other hand, there is a case that might be made where unintended 
consequences of misperceptions, among both market practitioners and policy makers, result 
in adverse and reinforcing dislocations under conditions of multiple equilibria, where both bad 
credits and good credits face correlation risk and markets go beyond temporary illiquidity and 
affect solvency and the basic allocation of funding, contributing to a systemic shock that 
could have implications for months if not years to come. However the current turmoil is 
resolved a key determinant will be psychology – both in the market and in policy making. 
5. Market  feedback 
In the course of recent meetings in Europe, North America, and Asia, we have asked 
members of our client base
12 to offer their views and feedback on issues related to the 
dynamics of FX and capital flows. 
FX 
•  The biggest mistake made this year and in recent periods has been to look for a 
unified field theory in FX… looking for a broad-based and consistent explanation 
rooted in fundamentals of policy frameworks and current account positions and 
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models of under-/over-valuation. If you expected fundamentals to predominate you 
have been carted out amidst the relentless, insidious depreciation of the Yen, albeit 
punctuated by brief but sharp corrections… and this despite the ending of 
Quantitative Easing Policy (QEP), subsequent first exit from Zero Interest Rate 
Policy (ZIRP), the promise of continued normalization of policy, and in context of the 
healthiest Japanese economy in more than 15 years with a large current account 
surplus and huge reserve position… this is a market notable for its distraction from 
such fundamentals and attention to carry and liquidity conditions. 
•  Perception creates its own reality these days… take the US Dollar from beginning of 
May through early July – the period prior to the latest bout of housing-credit-initiated 
concerns and risk re-appraisal: a period of increasing yields, a steepening of the 
curve, and the capitulation regarding the idea of Fed cuts… already, going into the 
June Fed meeting, the dollar’s slight rally (~2% in dollar index) had nearly entirely 
evaporated after the benign core CPI print mid-month and then was dealt a further 
blow from the outcome of a non-event: the manufactured tension about the Fed’s re-
focusing of its inflation attention towards headline versus core. The Fed was actually 
confirming in its more sanguine view on growth, still steadfast in its attention to 
inflation as the predominant policy risk, with not a whiff of a move from 5.25% 
nominal rates and with some greater confidence in deceleration of core inflation 
(i.e. likely higher real rates). And yet, when the imagined alteration of inflation focus 
did not occur it opened up a gulf (>2% depreciation to new multi-year lows in less 
than two weeks). 
•  Leveraged positions have been squared; there is risk aversion… some days; but 
there have been quick reversion days… people don’t want to hold positions as long 
and it is harder to get out of large positions. But you also see an appetite to re-load 
carry positions. The real question is “do you see turbulence beyond 2–3 months?” 
(turbulence that forces a change in strategy). So far you have created p&l volatility 
but you haven’t seen a full-fledged withdrawal from the market. 
•  FX as a portfolio asset, and investors looking to diversify, means it has generally 
spread all over the globe, funding with G10 Yen/Swiss and long carry in EM: there is 
no longer a real distinction between those asset classes; it is totally blended. It is 
now a total Portfolio Approach, driven by liquidity – liquidity drives everything – and 
willingness and need to invest. Not looking at contagion spreading from one country 
to another, but as soon as spreads widen someone is tempted to come in and close 
it. Argentina was trading at implied 20% last week and it sure was tempting to some 
deep pockets. No fear of sustained blow-up or contagion fuels this. In addition, 
funds have FX as part of a broader portfolio, so linkages to other market moves are 
a stronger variable now relative to what is going on in a given country’s economy. 
For example, in a CDO blow-out last week funds needed to make a margin call, and 
as the FX market is so liquid – a blow-out there means that the spread widens from 
2 to 5 pips, not like CDOs where the price disappears – they liquidated their carry 
trades to cover margins. With calm, the reverse has happened. So you had for 
example the Nikkei selling and yen strengthening – not weakening – because it was 
part of the CDO liquidity story, not a “sell Japan” story. 
•  If you come to trade FX in Asia after working in North America or Europe… you’d 
better have a hobby! (re: absence of volatility in the market) 
•  A much larger percentage of G10 FX is being transacted electronically, even over 
this last year or two; the buy side uses the API software provided to get prices 
between the bid/ask of banks and find the best buyer/seller. Banks are starting to 
get more sensitized and throw unprofitable customers out now. Even CTAs, who are 
traditionally seen as liquid market trend followers, trade every instrument that is 
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even within developed markets they will trade more exotic EUR/NOK for example 
rather than EUR/USD. Would say up to 40% of volume that is going through now is 
EM related. 
•  The key question to be answered in the next year or two is whether or not Asian 
currencies – not only China’s, though the scope of Chinese move will be a key 
factor – appreciate in a meaningful way and whether their economies diversify 
growth more towards consumption and see a fall in savings. If this doesn’t happen 
the tensions already present will only multiply and increase the risk of a greater 
dislocative adjustment later. 
Carry 
•  “Mrs Watanabe is not panicking” (re: retail carry trade)… it is not by and large a 
leveraged trade and they have had a great run over the last few years. This is hard 
to dislodge from the standpoint of yield and in the absence of confidence in local 
returns. And it is further reinforced by retail banking in Japan: they don’t have 
anything better to flog to retail clients, so banks will keep flogging it. 
•  As long as we are in a relatively liquid environment over the medium term, despite 
bouts of illiquidity, people will look to put the carry trade on, particularly if equities 
and fixed income are going to trade sideways. 
Credit 
•  No one has a good handle on the current credit spread blow-out… there are manifold 
uncertainties… at least with LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management in 1998) you 
knew the root cause was off-the-run treasuries and the problem was that everyone 
was in the same trade. Today you just don’t know… you know the risk is coming 
from nominally AAA-rated stuff that is dodgy but you don’t know where it all turns up, 
when, or how much even those who are exposed – e.g. in commercial paper or 
money markets – know that they are exposed and whether they had a sense of the 
potential scale of the risks when they loaded up on this stuff, even if only as 
enhanced-yield short-term parking for dollars. 
•  It is premature to say that the worst is over in the credit sphere. The initial subprime 
crisis became a wider credit problem, then a funding crisis gradually taking out 
any/all structures built on low volatility/guaranteed liquidity assumptions. Risk in the 
market now is on two fronts: one is what you have seen to date: the high yield (“toxic 
waste”) credits move the most savagely and to the point where they have now 
become cheap. Banks are in fact starting to take on long positions on some of these 
instruments because pricing has become so conservative. That in part is why 
Wednesday was one of the heaviest issuance days of the year in the US credit 
markets. Against that, however, some of higher rated credit, whilst wider, has not 
moved enough. Those have to feel more pain because the real damage to credit will 
occur when end investors in structured credit products start to want out. These are 
the Belgian dentists who have three-year/five-year and most recently 10-year deals 
looking for yield. Look to Europe for guidance on this as Europe is the big buyer of 
debt, at both wholesale and retail level. If Europe starts looking for an exit and banks 
don’t/can’t hold this back on the books (because they can no longer fund them on 
their own balance sheet) then the investment bank originators will have to try and 
break the structures down into individual credits again and sell those back into the 
market on that basis, no doubt cascading on top of the backlog of issuance that is 
building up during this current bout of dislocation. That is when the trouble will really 
start, and when the credit markets will be most vulnerable to locking up. Once that 44  BIS Papers No 39
 
 
difficult period is negotiated then there is a belief that the markets will settle down 
and the machinery will kick back into life, though with a normal rather than incredibly 
flat credit curve... which is what officials have been asking for these past couple of 
years. It will be interesting to see how central banks work around trying to establish 
just how much additional tightening of monetary policy this shift back to steeper 
credit curves equates to. 
6.  Issues and questions for further discussion
13 
•  Sustained illiquidity, risk of contagion: Will the current bout of credit market turmoil, 
illiquidity, and risk re-appraisal be different, create a sea-change – for market 
practitioners and central bankers alike – in the approach to capital flows, carry, and 
risk, or will the strength of structural liquidity and a search for yield be reasserted? 
Can being more reactive rather than proactive create as many problems as it avoids 
(moral hazard avoided but at greater risk of illiquidity becoming more entrenched, 
more difficult to restore)? 
•  Liquidity antagonism and policy communication: Between short-term systemic 
cyclical liquidity challenges and optimal monetary policy in the context of 
unprecedented structural liquidity, can central banks in the current environment 
differentiate between providing short-term systemic-functioning liquidity and 
operating medium-term macro monetary policy and communicate the difference, 
even/especially when they are perceived as contradictory (e.g. ECB, RBA, BoJ, BoC 
adding day-to-day liquidity against backdrop of actual or potential macro policy 
tightening)? Will market practitioners give such central bank actions credence or is 
there a risk of perceived moral hazard? 
•  Retrospective myopia: There is a tendency to try to fit the present and future into 
past experiences and cycles – nostalgia for increasingly less applicable past 
analogues. Policy makers may be increasingly more forward-looking in their 
approach to making policy but many in the market start from the point of putting the 
current economic cycle and policy into the context of past cycles and the lessons or 
expectations gleaned from them. 
•  Capacity constraints, productive allocation of factors: Whether global capacity 
constraints are resolved in terms of investment in productive new capacity or 
whether they add more inflationary impulses that have to be countered by more 
restrictive monetary policy. 
•  Inflation tension: Tensions underlying the discussion and interpretation of recent 
trends in core and headline data and their effect on policy formulation and 
implementation. What if the current energy and agriculture impulses are not 
temporary shocks but structural transformations in the context of the global growth 
trend of the last two decades, the scarcity of resources, and increased costs of 
extraction, particularly now and going forward as more and more of the developing 
world increases consumption and becomes more urbanized, and thus more energy 
intensive? 
•  Sovereign liquidity: Sovereign pools of FX reserves: how will the continued 
expansion of sovereign pools develop; how well will the flows be intermediated and 
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distributed; do international fora facilitate agreement on best practices, and if so, 
how; and how do sovereign investment funds seeking increased returns affect 
capital flows and investment – impedance of policy or facilitation of stability? 
•  Central bank control: Are central banks losing control, or will they in future (or do 
they matter as much as before, at least in the near term), particularly strict 
targeters? Has policy become less effective even as or because it has become 
more ordered, or is it merely a question of different lags in policy transmission/ 
impedance? Is this a temporary issue of impedance or something likely more 
structural? If policy has become less effective, is it an issue that can or should be 
addressed by the central banks or is it simply an objective fact of life that has to be 
acknowledged and adapted to by agents? 
•  New contagion risks: We need to think about confronting new contagion risks in a 
fundamentally less controllable environment. Given the sheer size and degree of 
integration of the global economic and financial systems and the acceleration of 
trading volumes, and given less predominance of one source of bailout consumption 
or liquidity provision, how should/will market practitioners and/or policy makers 
adapt/respond? Are current practices and frameworks for monitoring risks in the 
system sufficiently adapted to the changes in the nature of lending (more dispersed, 
less concentrated – spreading out risks on the one hand but also meaning that there 
is no small group of connected lenders that can call time out and focus on orderly 
workouts)? 
•  Cycle risk: 2008… the end of the upgrades? Is there downgrade risk? Could it be 
brought forward to the latter part of 2007? What if it is not enough to clearly make a 
case for global policy reversal? In other words, what if we get through the illiquidity 
episode in terms of stabilizing primary lending quickly and eventually start working 
out broader credit inventory and indigestion issues, but still have to pay in terms of a 
hangover effect, one dampening the currently still extraordinarily positive global 
forecasts? What if policy, even boring, measured policy, even after having been 
impeded for long periods by massive liquidity, inverted yield curves, etc.… what if 
that past and current policy does catch up with its lag on a maturing global cycle 
facing some sustained tests to confidence, but only just? And what if, paradoxically, 
this global lagged policy tightening is amplified by busted conundra, as nominal 
curves disinvert despite an absence of unstable, uncontained inflation, such that 
what tightening that hits a decelerating global economy is magnified by the long 
sought after re-pricing of risk, only coming slightly more suddenly and less orderly 
than the ideal? For good measure, what if there is a bit more atmospheric 
uncertainty – say from a bit of post-Olympics indigestion in China, some post-power 
transfer indigestion in Russia, some geopolitical and US political – and global 
populist protectionist noises get louder, mixing with the increased financial market 
risk aversion, continued corporate risk aversion, and continued food and energy 
inflation pressure on policy frameworks? Is anyone really ready for the party to end 
with a whimper? 46  BIS Papers No 39
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